A seminal result of Cleve (STOC 1986) showed that fairness, in general, is impossible to achieve in case of two-party computation if one of them is malicious. Ben-Or et al. (STOC 1988) and Chaum et al. (STOC 1988) showed that absolute correctness can be achieved in case of multiparty computation when one third players are faulty. However, they analyzed the problem in broadcasting channel model. In non-simultaneous channel model, Gordon et al. (STOC 2008) observed that there exist some functions for which fairness can be achieved even though one of the two parties is malicious. One of the functions considered by Gordon et al. is exactly the millionaires' problem (Yao, FOCS 1982) or, equivalently, the 'greater than' function. The problem deals with two millionaires, Alice and Bob, who are interested in finding who amongst them is richer, without revealing their actual wealth to each other. We, for the first time, study this problem in presence of rational players. In particular, we show that Gordon's protocol no longer remains fair when the players are rational. Next, we design a protocol with rational players, that not only achieves fairness, but also achieves correctness and strict Nash equilibrium for natural utilities. Gordon et al. (JACM, 2011) showed that any function over polynomial-size domains which does not contain an "embedded XOR" can be converted into the greater than function. Thus, the proposed protocol is applicable for any function except embedded XOR. We, also for the first time, provide a solution to the quantum version of millionaires' problem with rational players. Like the classical case, our quantum protocol also achieves fairness, correctness and strict Nash equilibrium. This paper introduces another novel concept. Both our classical and quantum protocols follow a unified approach; both use a rational third party rather than a trusted or untrusted third party, to mediate between the players. We exploit the idea of interlocking system between the players, to prevent the deviating party to abort early. In both the cases, we remove the requirement of the online dealer of Groce et al. (EUROCRYPT 2012).
Introduction and Motivation
In a secure two-party computation, two parties or players want to compute a particular function of their inputs along with preserving specific security notions, such as, fairness, correctness etc. Informally, correctness means that no party computes a wrong function and complete fairness means that either every one or no one computes the function.
In [7] , Cleve showed an impossible result that certain functions cannot be computed with complete fairness without an honest majority. From this, the community conjectured that no function can be computed without an honest majority. However, in [3, 5] the authors showed that absolute correctness can be achieved in case of multiparty computation with one third faulty players. They proposed the solution in broadcasting channel model. After more than two decades, Gordon et al. [11] came with a set of functions for which complete fairness is possible for two-party computation in non-simultaneous channel model, even if one of the players is malicious.
One particular function of interest in Gordon's paper was the Yao's millionaires' problem [42] , or more precisely, the 'greater than' function. The problem deals with two millionaires, Alice and Bob, who are interested in finding who amongst them is richer, without revealing their actual wealth to each other. We revisit the same it is much simpler than the earlier schemes. The quantum protocol use a rational third party with appropriate incentives as in the classical version, and thus remove the requirement of online dealer, like the classical one.
In classical domain, we frame out the problem with rational players both in fail-stop and Byzantine setting. However, in quantum case, we consider only the fail-stop setting.
Contributions
Below we summarize our main contributions in this work.
1. We study Yao's millionaires' problem [42] with rational players for the first time (in non-simultaneous channel model) and show that if the deviating player has a higher incentive to make the other reach a wrong conclusion than to learn the secret himself (i.e., if U N F > U T T ), Gordon's protocol [11] for solving this problem no longer remains fair.
2. We propose a variant of Gordon's protocol [11] and show that our protocol is correct, fair and can achieve strict Nash equilibrium for natural utilities. In [12] , Gordon et al. proved that any function over polynomial size domain which does not include embedded XOR can be reduced into the greater than function. In this logic, our proposed protocol is also applicable for the computation of any function except the embedded 'XOR'.
3. For the first time we introduce rational players in the quantum version of millionaires' problem, and as a solution we provide a quantum protocol that is not only fair, correct and achieves strict Nash equilibrium, but it is much simpler than the earlier schemes [21, 22, 19, 41, 37] .
4. This paper introduces another novel concept. It uses a rational third party rather than a trusted or untrusted third party, to mediate between the players. In both classical and quantum secure computation paradigms, for the first time a rational intermediate player is used to avoid early abort in two-party computation.
5. In both classical and quantum paradigms, we borrow ideas from rational secret sharing to keep the dealer offline, unlike the work of Groce and Katz [16] .
Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly describe the concepts of rationality, fairness, correctness, fail-stop and Byzantine setting used in this work. We define a function reconstruction protocol with rational adversary to be a pair (Γ, − → σ ), where Γ is the game (i.e., specification of allowable actions) and − → σ =(σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) denotes the strategies followed by n number of players. We use the notations − → σ −w and (σ ′ w , − → σ −w ) respectively for (σ 1 , . . . , σ w−1 , σ w+1 , . . . , σ n ) and (σ 1 , . . . , σ w−1 , σ ′ w , σ w+1 , . . . , σ n ). The outcome of the game is denoted by − → o (Γ, − → σ )=(o 1 , . . . , o n ). The set of possible outcomes with respect to a party P w is as follows. 1) P w correctly computes f , while others do not; 2) everybody correctly computes f ; 3) nobody computes f ; 4) others computes f correctly, while P w does not and 5) others believe in a wrong functional value, while P w does not.
The output that no function is computed is denoted by ⊥ (i.e., null as in [11] ) and output of wrong computation is denoted by ⇁.
In classical domain, the adversary that controls a player may be computationally bounded, but in quantum domain the adversary is always assumed to have unbounded computational power. In order to keep an uniform approach, we assume a computationally unbounded adversary throughout the entire paper.
Utilities and Preferences
The utility function u w of each party P w is defined over the set of possible outcomes of the game. The outcomes and corresponding utilities for two parties are described in Table 1 . For quantum domain, the utilities remain same. 
Players have their preferences based on the different possible outcomes. In this work, a rational player w is assumed to have the following preference:
Some players may have the additional preference U 
Correctness
A formal definition of correctness in the context of a (2,2) RSS protocol was presented by Asharov and Lindell [1] . We modify the definition of [1] as follows.
Definition 1. (Correctness)
A rational function reconstruction mechanism (Γ, − → σ ) is said to be correct if for every arbitrary alternative strategy σ ′ w followed by party P w , (w ∈ {1, . . . , n}), the following holds:
Fairness
A rational player, being selfish, desires an unfair outcome, i.e., computing the function alone. Therefore, the basic aim of rational computation has been to achieve fairness. A formal definition of fairness in the context of a (2,2) RSS protocol was presented by Asharov and Lindell [1] .
We modify the definition of [1] as follows:
Definition 2. (Fairness) A rational function reconstruction mechanism (Γ, − → σ ) is said to be completely fair if for every arbitrary alternative strategy σ ′ w followed by party P w , (w ∈ {1, . . . , n}), the following holds:
In the above definitions, the subscript −w denotes all the players other than w.
Equilibrium
A suggested strategy − → σ of a mechanism (Γ, − → σ ) is said to be in Nash equilibrium when there is no incentive for a player P w to deviate from the suggested strategy, given that everyone else is following this strategy. The concept of strict Nash equilibrium becomes useful when the payoffs from playing a 'good' strategy and a 'bad' strategy are so close that any minor changes in the beliefs of players about the strategy others are going to adopt may lead each of them to play the 'bad' strategy [23] . It is defined as follows: 
Fail-stop and Byzantine settings
In the fail-stop setting, each party follows the protocol as directed except that it may choose to abort at any time [16] and a party is assumed not to change its input when running the protocol. On the other hand, in Byzantine setting, a deviating party may behave arbitrarily. It may change the inputs or may choose to abort. For the classical solution, we consider both the settings.
In a classical RSS protocol, the dealer signs each share so that no player can give out wrong shares to others. However, in the quantum setting the scenario is different. Typically, quantum signature schemes consider signing either classical messages [14] or quantum message string with independent qubits [27] . In these works, there is no concept of entanglement among the distributed shares, whereas in our proposed scheme, the shares are entangled. It is not known how to sign such qubits which contain the information of the secret, as any type of measurement on that qubits will destroy the entanglement and hence the information related to the secret. For this reason, we assume that a rational player in the quantum setting is fail-stop by nature, i.e., he may abort early in an attempt to obtain the secret alone but does not send false shares of the secret.
3 Revisiting the Millionaires' Problem [11] with Rational Players
In this section, we first describe the millionaires' problem or, more precisely, the greater than function, proposed by Gordon et al. [11] . We, then, will show how fairness condition is affected in the presence of the rational players having the preferences R 1 . Let us denote two players by P 1 and P 2 . Suppose P 1 has the secret i and P 2 has the secret j, 1 ≤ i ≤ M , 1 ≤ j ≤ M . The dealer gives an ordered list X = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x M } to P 1 and another ordered list Y = {y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y M } to P 2 . Then P 1 sends x i to the dealer and P 2 sends y j to the dealer. Let f be a deterministic function which maps X × Y → {0, 1} × {0, 1}. The function f (x i , y j ) can be defined as a pair of outputs, i.e., f (x i , y j ) = (f 1 (x i , y j ), f 2 (x i , y j )), where f 1 (x i , y j ) is the output of the first party and f 2 (x i , y j ) is the output of the second party. For millionaires' problem, the function is defined as follows [11] . For w = 1, 2,
The protocol proceeds in a series of M iterations. The dealer creates two sequences {a l } and {b l }, l = 1, 2, . . . , M , as follows.
For l = i, a l =⊥ and for l = j, b l =⊥. Next, the dealer splits the secret a l into the shares a l )} to P 2 . In each round l, P 2 sends a 2 l to P 1 , who, in turn sends b 1 l to P 2 . P 1 learns the output value f 1 (x i , y j ) in iteration i, and P 2 learns the output in iteration j. As we require three elements, 0, 1 and ⊥, we define 0 by 00, 1 by 11 and ⊥ by 01. The algorithm for the functionality share generation in fail-stop setting is revisited in Algorithm 1. Here we assume that the dealer who will distribute the shares is honest and can compute the function described in Equation (1).
Inputs: 1 xi from P1 and yj from P2. If one of the received input is not in the correct domain, then both the parties are given ⊥.
Computation:
The dealer does the following: 2 Prepares a list listw of shares for each party Pw, where w ∈ {1, 2} such that P1 receives the values of a 
There are M number of iterations. In each iteration l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , M} do:
5 If P2 aborts in round l, i.e., does not send its share at that round and l ≤ i, P1 outputs 1. If l > i, P1 has already determined the output in some earlier iteration. Thus it outputs that value.
6 If P1 aborts in round l, i.e., does not send its share at that round and l ≤ j, P2 outputs 0. If l > j, P2 has already determined the output in some earlier iteration. Thus it outputs that value.
Algorithm 2: Π
CMP
The protocol for computing f is described in Algorithm 2.
The algorithms in the Byzantine setting is same as the fail-stop setting except some additional steps. In Byzantine setting, the shares are signed by the dealer. Along with the shares of the function, the dealer also distributes some secret keys k a , k b ← Gen(1 λ ), where λ is the security parameter. 
Otherwise both continues the protocol Π CMP which outputs a i (b j ) for
Exploiting the MAC signature, we can resist the players to send a false share. In quantum case the scenario is different as we discuss in Section 2. Thus in quantum case, we assume that the players are in fail-stop by nature.
Analysis of Fairness
In this section, we revisit the fairness issue in the millionaires' problem [11] considering the rational players. We also assume that the players, P 1 and P 2 have the preferences R 1 . Either of the players also has U N F w ≥ U T T w . We observed that Gordon's protocol [11] is no longer fair in this case.
for some player P w , the protocol Π CMP is not completely fair.
Proof. Suppose P 1 deviates before giving its share in round l, where 1 ≤ l ≤ M . Now, if i ≤ j, its utility is given by
When 1 ≤ l < i, P 2 outputs 0 and correctly concludes that i ≤ j, but P 1 outputs ⊥. When i ≤ l ≤ M , P 1 obtains the function and both correctly conclude that i ≤ j. If i > j, its utility is given by
When 1 ≤ l ≤ j, P 2 outputs 0 and wrongly concludes that i ≤ j, but P 1 outputs ⊥. When j < l < i, P 1 outputs ⊥, but P 2 correctly concludes that i > j. When i ≤ l ≤ M , both computes the function and both correctly conclude that i > j.
Since i is known to P 1 , the expected utility of P 1 is given by
where
and Pr(i > j) = i−1 M . Plugging in the values from Equation (2) and (3) into Equation (4), we get
Note that in the first case, i.e., for 1 ≤ l < i, the second term corresponding to i > j involves two sub cases, namely, 1 ≤ j < l < i and l ≤ j < i.
Observe that when i ≤ l ≤ M , P 1 has already obtained the secret, but by aborting it cannot increase its utility beyond U T T 1 . However, when l < i, we may have
prevents the protocol to achieve fairness in this case. The analysis for P 2 is similar, except we have the role of i and j interchanged.
How to make Π CMP fair
In this section, we propose a variant of the Gordon's [11] protocol. In the earlier section, we have observed that Π CMP suffers from early abort. In [16] it is shown that two party fair computation is possible. However, their scheme exploits the concepts of online dealer, which is not very practical, as in each iteration the dealer has to interact with the players and has to ask them whether they will choose abort. Another restriction in their scheme is that the deviating player can not escape from its decision knowing that the round it has chosen to abort is less than or equal to the revelation round. Exploiting the idea of the indicator bit, one can make the dealer offline. We propose a new protocol with a rational intermediate player for offline dealer and show that the protocol is U N F -independent and hence correct [2] . We also prove fairness and strict Nash equilibrium for our protocol. Our protocol is described in Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4. Though our protocol initially addresses towards the millionaires' problem, it is applicable for any function which does not have any embedded XOR.
The dealer does the following: 2 Insert an intermediate player P3. 3 Chooses r according to a geometric distribution G(γ) with parameter γ and sets r as the revelation round, i.e., the round in which the value of f is either (0, 0) or (1, 1). 4 Chooses d according to the geometrical distribution G(γ) and sets the total number of iterations as m = r + d. 5 Prepares a list listw of shares for each party Pw, where w ∈ {1, 2, 3} such that P1 receives the values of a 
, where xi and yj are parties inputs. 9 For l ∈ {1, . . . , m}, l = r, set a l =⊥. 10 For l ∈ {1, . . . , m}, l = r, set b l =⊥.
11 a1, a2, . . . , am and b1, b2, . . . , bm corresponds to the outputs of P1 and P2 respectively for 1 ≤ l ≤ m.
Algorithm 3: ShareGen for Π

CMP fair
Here, the intermediate player, P 3 , is considered as a rational player who is guided by his expected utility or revenue at the end of the game. He will participate in the game in the motivation towards maximizing his utility. In non-rational setting, P 3 is termed as an 'untrusted third party'.
The revenues with respect to P 3 are of two types: 1) virtual revenue, such as reputation in the society [32] , and 2) materialistic revenue, such as money. The utility function corresponds to the reputation is denoted by U 3,rep whereas the utility function corresponds to the materialistic revenue is denoted by U 3,mon .
We also define U 3,mon = max 
determined the output in some earlier iteration. Thus it outputs that value. 9 If P1 aborts in round l, i.e., does not send its share at that round and l ≤ r, P2 outputs ⊥. If l > r, P2 has already determined the output in some earlier iteration. Thus it outputs that value. 10 If P1 or P2 does not send its share to P3, P3 outputs ⊥ to the both of the players.
11 If P3 does not send its computed share to any one of the party Pw , w ∈ {1, 2}, in a round l, Pw chooses to abort from the very next round and the protocol will be terminated.
Algorithm 4: Π
CMP fair where δ w is the amount of money paid by a player w to P 3 . Let the maximum amount of money that can be given by P w to P 3 be denoted by δ max w . Since the players are rational,
for w ∈ {1, 2}.
U 3,rep may follow a trust function model as in [32] or any other model. Our only assumption is that all the utilities are expressed in the same units. In each round, before delivering his shares to the players, P 3 approaches both the players individually whether they are willing to give him the money. If U 3,mon ≤ U 3,rep for that round, P 3 rejects the offers and simply follows the protocol. Otherwise, he helps the player who gives him more money to get the secret alone by not sending the corresponding share to the player's opponent. In case both offers the same amount of money (under the case U 3,mon > U 3,rep ), P 3 sends the share to both.
In our mechanism, there are three players, namely P 1 , P 2 and P 3 . For the condition of achieving correctness, fairness and strict Nash equilibrium, we have to assume that when one of the players deviates, others are sticking to the protocol. Thus, we have 1. P 1 deviates (P 2 and P 3 follow the protocol).
2. P 2 deviates (P 1 and P 3 follow the protocol).
3. P 3 deviates (P 1 and P 2 follow the protocol).
In fail-stop setting, the deviation of P 1 and P 2 is considered as early abort whereas in Byzantine setting the players behave arbitrarily. That means they can abort early as well as can send the arbitrary inputs or can swap the inputs. In case of P 3 , the possible deviation is to abort early, i.e., not sending the share(s) to both or to one of the players.
We analyze the security notions such as correctness, fairness and Nash equilibrium considering all the above issues. The following theorems show that our proposed mechanism is correct, fair and achieves strict Nash equilibrium.
In Byzantine setting, the shares given to the players are signed by the dealer so that no player can send a false share to the other player. The signing procedure discussed in Section 3 remains similar in our protocol expect M is replaced by m and with some additional steps.
• For 1 ≤ l ≤ m, P 1 is given (c • For 1 ≤ l ≤ m, P 2 is given (c • P 3 is given MAC key k c1 and MAC key k c2 so that for 1 ≤ l ≤ m, it can verify the shares by algorithm V rf y kc 1 (l c There is no need to sign the shares given to P 3 as P 3 is fail-stop by nature.
Theorem 2. The protocol Π
CMP
Fair is U N F w -independent for w ∈ {1, 2} and hence correct.
Proof. Before going to the proof, we should recall that the deviations of P 1 and P 2 are similar. Thus for simplicity, here, we only consider the deviations of P 1 . The deviation of P 3 is analyzed separately.
In this case, the main reason of deviation of P 1 is to deceive P 2 , more explicitly to make P 2 believe in a wrong statement. That is, when i ≤ j, P 2 will conclude that i > j and vice versa depending on the movement of P 1 .
In fail-stop setting, if P 1 aborts early and the round in which he aborts is less than j, according to Gordon's protocol, P 2 will output 0 and conclude that i ≤ j. When i > j, it is the situation when P 2 is deceived by P 1 . However, our protocol is designed in such a way that if P 1 has chosen to abort in any round before r, P 2 will output ⊥ and does not conclude anything. Thus, P 1 can not deceive P 2 by early abort. There is no incentive for P 1 to abort in a round l > r, as P 2 has already determined the output in some earlier iteration.
In case of Byzantine setting, P 1 can send arbitrary shares to both P 2 and P 3 , so that P 2 will finally compute a wrong function. But since each share is signed by the dealer, no one can send an arbitrary share to the other. Another important deviation of P 1 in this setting is to swap the inputs. By swapping the inputs, P 1 can make P 2 compute a wrong function when he himself plays the game honestly. As all the inputs came from the same dealer, there is no chance to catch this type of deviation by considering only the signature scheme. However, we consider signature with tagging. Each share is tagged by t 
The similar case will happen for P 3 when P 1 tries to swap the corresponding share for him so that the final output at the end of P 2 will be wrong. P 3 is given MAC key k c1 so that for 1 ≤ l ≤ m, it can verify the shares that come from P 1 by the algorithm V rf y kc 1 (l c Now we consider the deviation of P 3 . As we assume that P 3 is fail-stop by nature, the only deviation possible is to abort early, i.e., neither he sends the shares to both of the players or sends the share to only one of them. In the first scenario, both the players output ⊥ and do not conclude anything. In the second scenario, if P 1 gets the share and P 2 does not, P 2 will outputs ⊥ and concludes nothing. Thus, by aborting early P 3 can not deceive the players. Moreover, he has no incentive to do so. According to his utilities he can not maximize his payoff by deceiving the players. Thus, assuming P 1 has U N F 1 > U T T 1 , the mechanism is designed in such a way that it becomes U N F 1 independent and hence correct. Proceeding in the same way for P 2 , we can prove the U N F 2 independence. Proof. In our proposed protocol, there are three players, P 1 , P 2 and P 3 . In the fairness condition we have to study the deviation of any player from the suggested strategy when others are sticking to the protocol.
Let us assume that the player P 1 is deviating. The analysis when P 2 deviates is similar. In this case, the reason for deviation is to get the function alone. In fail-stop as well as in Byzantine setting P 1 can abort in round l. P 1 may choose three types of abort in round l. It may not send its share to P 2 or it may not send its share to P 3 or it may not send its share to both P 2 and P 3 . If P 1 does not send its share to P 2 , then P 2 will not send its share to P 3 . As a result the protocol will be terminated. Similarly, if P 1 does not send its share to P 3 , according to the protocol P 3 will output ⊥ to both the players. In the third case, the protocol will be terminated from the begging of the round l. Thus, there is no incentive for P 1 to abort early in the motivation to get the secret alone. Now, we consider the deviations of P 3 . As P 3 plays the game either for reputation or for money, he cannot maximize his utility by not giving the share to both of the players. Thus the only deviation remained for P 3 is to send the share to only one of the player, say to P 1 . Without loss of generality, we assume δ
The best strategy for P 1 is to pay maximum amount of money, i.e., δ 1 = δ
, to ensure that he will obtain the function alone. In this case, P 2 has no incentive to spend the money for that round, as even with his maximum capacity, he cannot offer greater amount of money. Moreover, he will loose his utility value by an amount of (U N N 2 − δ 2 ) if l < r, or by an amount of (U N T 2 − δ 2 ) if l = r. Now, we will show that P 1 also has no incentive to pay the money for round l. According to the protocol, to obtain the secret alone with the help of P 3 , P 1 has to guess correctly the revelation round. Otherwise, the protocol will be terminated from the very next round and both the players get no information about the function. Suppose, P 1 guesses the l-th round to be the revelation round and gives P 3 the money for that round so that P 3 will not send the corresponding share to P 2 for that round. If the guess is correct, i.e., l = r, the probability of which is γ, its utility is (U T N 1 − δ 1 ). Otherwise, its utility is (U N N 1 − δ 1 ), as in this case P 2 will abort from the next round. So the expected utility of P 1 is given by
The last inequality follows from our assumptions that δ 1 is positive and γU
1 . Thus P 1 has no incentive to offer money to the intermediate player in the motivation to get the function alone.
In this case, P 3 will play the game in the motivation to maximize U 3,rep . He will send the shares to both of the players. Thus, Π Proof. For the Nash equilibrium condition, we have to study the deviation of any player from the suggested strategy when others are sticking to the protocol.
In this game, we deal with the three players, P 1 , P 2 and P 3 . The deviation of P 1 and P 2 is similar. Here, we consider the deviations of P 1 and P 3 . The analysis for P 2 and P 3 will be the same.
Let us assume that player P 1 follows the deviating strategy σ ′ 1 , when P 2 follows the protocol. Here, P 1 has two options to increase his payoff. P 1 can abort in round l in the motivation to get the secret alone or can give the money to P 3 so that P 3 will send the corresponding share to P 1 but not to P 2 . In Theorem 3 we have showed that P 1 should have no incentive to abort in the round l. It is more advantageous for him to pay the money to P 3 and make P 3 stop to send the share to P 2 . Suppose P 1 gives the money to P 3 and makes P 3 stop to send the corresponding share to P 2 in round l. Pr [l≤r] . Then, the expected value of u 1 (σ
We do not consider the case l > r, as after the revelation round the players have no incentive to continue the protocol. The last inequality follows from our assumptions that δ 1 is positive and γU
The same thing will happen in the case of the deviations of P 2 and P 3 . As, no one can increase his expected utility value by spending money beyond U T T w , both the players play the game according to the protocol. In this situation, P 3 will send the shares to both the players as he is willing to increase his utility value U 3,rep . Hence (σ
Here, z ∈ {1, 2, 3}, σ 0 = σ 3 and σ 4 = σ 1 .
Note that for both the proofs of Theorem 3 and Theorem 4, we assume the case U 3,mon > U 3,rep . Combining Theorem 3, 4, we can conclude that Nash equilibrium is necessary condition for achieving fairness.
Quantum Millionaires' Problem with Rational Players
Recently, significant effort has been given towards bridging the gap between two apparently unrelated domains, namely, cryptography and game theory [2, 16, 17] . Cryptography deals with the worst case scenario, making the protocols secure against malicious behaviour of a party. However, in game theoretic perspective, a protocol is designed against the rational deviation of a party.
In [15] it was commented that quantum secret sharing can be treated as a game between the legitimate parties. Very recently, Brunner and Linden [4] showed a deep link between quantum physics and game theory.
By bringing quantum mechanics into the game, they showed that players who can use quantum resources, such as entangled quantum particles, can outperform classical players. This is because of the fact that, in classical domain, the security depends on some computational hardness and thus is conditional. On the other hand, in quantum domain, the security comes from the laws of physics and thus is unconditional. In this paper, for the first time, we introduce the rationality concept of game theory in quantum two party computation, specially in quantum version of millionaires' problem [21, 22, 19, 41, 37] .
All the works in quantum domain that have been directed towards the millionaires' problem, analyze several eavesdropping strategies considering 'worst case scenario' in cryptology. In this work, we for the first time, try to introduce the game theoretic concept of rationality in millionaires' problem.
In [21] , the millionaires' problem is studied considering continuous variable. Jia et al. [22] dealt the problem with semi-honest party. He [19] exploited the idea of quantum key distribution to solve the problem. Tseng et al. [37] proposed the use of Bell state to solve this problem. Their protocol also exploits a third party to assist the players. Yang et al. [41] showed the vulnerability of their protocol if the third party is disloyal. On the contrary, we propose a quantum millionaires' problem exploiting the idea of quantum secret sharing [8, 9, 20] , more specifically quantum rational secret sharing [30] . Like the classical domain, in quantum domain also we propose a protocol for quantum millionaires' problem. Our protocol is much simpler than the earlier protocol and also more practical as it consider the rationality issues.
Here, we exploit the eight GHZ state basis [34, 39, 38] and the set of four Pauli matrices {I, X, Y, Z} [31] . The classical information associated with the Pauli matrices are defined as I = 00, X = 01, Y = 10, Z = 11. The maximally entangled three particle state is |g 0 =
This state is called Green-HorneZeilinger(GHZ) state. There are eight independent GHZ states. They are
We need any three of these orthogonal states. In this work, without loss of generality, we consider |g 0 , |g 1 and |g 2 . In quantum millionaires' problem, we assume that all three players are rational and fail-stop in nature. P 3 may help either of the players, P 1 or P 2 , to get the function alone, in exchange of money just like the classical one. Our protocol is described in Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 6. (|000 − |111 ).
6 For each l ∈ {1, . . . , m}, l = r, prepares two copies of |g3 = 1 √ 2 (|100 + |011 ). 7 Dealer Chooses a unitary operator from the set of 2 × 2 Pauli operators randomly and operates that on the third qubit of each entangled state. Output: 8 For l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m} dealer prepares a list listw of shares for each party Pw , where w ∈ {1, 2, 3} such that:
(a) Each player Pw is given a qubit from each entangled state. P1 is given the first qubit of each entangled state , P2 is given the second qubit of each entangled state where as P3 is given the third qubit of each entangled state.
(b) Each list contains 2m number of qubits.
(c) list1 and list2 contain additional classical information related to the Pauli matrices applied on the third qubits. list1
contains the information about the second copy of the entangled state, denoted as c 1 l ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11}, where as list2 contains the information about the first copy of the entangled state, denoted by c 2 l ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11} for the round l.
Algorithm 5: QShareGen
Inputs: 1 Each of P1, P2 and P3 receives his corresponding list of shares.
The players do the following. 2 Each round is subdivided into two sub-rounds. 3 In first sub-round, P2 sends the first qubit of its list to P1. 4 In second sub-round, P1 sends the second qubit of its list to P2. 5 After receiving the share fromP2, P1 sends c 1 l to P3, else halts. 6 After receiving the share fromP1, P2 sends c 2 l to P3, else halts. 7 P3 applies the inverse Pauli operations on both the qubits and sends the first qubit to P1 and then the second qubit to P2 for each round l. 8 After receiving the qubits from P3, P1 measures the three qubits in GHZ basis. If it will be |g0 , then concludes f (xi, yj ) = 0. If it will be |g1 , concludes f (xi, yj) = 1. If it will be |g2 , concludes ⊥. 9 After receiving the qubits from P3, P2 measures the three qubits in GHZ basis. If it will be |g0 , then concludes f (xi, yj ) = 0. If it will be |g1 , concludes f (xi, yj) = 1. If it will be |g2 , concludes ⊥.
Output: 10 If P2 aborts in round l, i.e., does not send its share at that round and l ≤ r, P1 outputs ⊥. If l > r, P1 has already determined the output in some earlier iteration. Thus it outputs that value. 11 If P1 aborts in round l, i.e., does not send its share at that round and l ≤ r, P2 outputs ⊥. If l > r, P2 has already determined the output in some earlier iteration. Thus it outputs that value. 12 If P1 or P2 does not send its share to P3, P3 outputs ⊥ to the both of the players.
13 If P3 does not send its computed share to any one of the party Pw , w ∈ {1, 2}, in a round l, Pw chooses abort from the very next round and the protocol will be terminated.
Algorithm 6: Π
QMP Fair
Security Issues
Our protocols are proposed to resist rational adversary. Rational adversary is neither 'good' nor 'bad'. They participate in the game with a motivation to maximize their utility. In cryptography, one may consider this as a special type of attack vector. However, this does not impose any special condition on adversary, it rather adds more flexibility to the adversary.
In rational setting, the security notions consist of fairness, correctness and Nash equilibrium. Similar to the classical case, one can easily prove that the protocol Π QMP Fair is U N F -independent and hence correct. Further, with suitable choice of γ > 0, the protocol achieves fairness and strict Nash equilibrium. All the proofs are going to the same direction as the classical case.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we revisit the 'greater than' function proposed by Gordon et al. [11] which serves the goal of millionaires' problem. We observed that the protocol for computing the function suggested by Gordon et al. no longer remains fair in the presence of the rational players having some specific set of utilities. We proposed a variant of this protocol both in classical as well as in quantum domain which successfully can compute the function with fairness and correctness and achieves strict Nash equilibrium with the presence of the rational adversary.
We take an uniform approach in designing both the classical and the quantum protocols. We insert an intermediate player and exploit an interlocking system to prevent a party from early abort. We handled the issue relating to obtain the secret alone by introducing the concept of revelation round for traditional rational secret sharing. The intermediate player is also rational in nature. He may help any one of the player to get the function alone in the motivation to maximize his utility which is defined in terms of money. Our only assumption on this player is that it is fail-stop by nature. Otherwise, it may send a false share to the player who does not give him the money. Designing a fair protocol for Byzantine P 3 with the incentive to deceive the players is an interesting future research problem.
In both classical and quantum domain, ours is the first protocols for millionaires' problem which consider rationality issues, and is thus more practical. Though the paper mainly deals with millionaires' problem, the suggested protocols can be implemented for any function which does not contain any embedded 'XOR' [12] .
In this work, we restrict the utilities of P 3 within reputation and monetary gain. Introducing additional utilities for P 3 and analyzing how to achieve fairness in this situation is an interesting research problem that we plan to take up as our future work.
